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It is widely accepted both in theory and in practice that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy 
norm on the appropriateness of moral blame.  In the terminology of the recent literature on these 
topics, one has standing to blame only if, as a first approximation, one is not guilty of the very offence 
one seeks to criticize.  Our acceptance of this norm – or one like it – is embodied in the common 
retorts to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?”, and “Look who’s talking!” If I regularly fail to 
reply to your emails on time, for instance, I’m in no moral position to criticize you for not replying 
to my emails on time – crucially, even if you are indeed blameworthy for this failure, and, crucially, 
even if someone else can appropriately make this criticism.  Precisely how to formulate and 
motivate the non-hypocrisy norm on the standing to blame is a complicated affair.  But the 
following is uncontroversial: if there is a standing-norm on blame at all, then there is some suitable 
non-hypocrisy norm on standing to blame.1   
 But there is a paradox lurking behind this seemingly commonplace norm in the ethics of 
blame.  And this is that this is a condition, it would seem, that we necessarily cannot meet with 
respect to ourselves.  Consider a (colourful) character we might call Jones the Adulterer: 
 
Caught in adultery for the third time, someone asked Jones how he felt about his moral 
failings.  He replied, “Well, I don’t feel I’m in position to cast any blame. Unfortunately, 
I’ve been known to commit adultery myself.”  
 
Jones’ stance here is certainly surprising.  And yet: prima facie, it would seem to be a 
straightforward application of the non-hypocrisy norm on the standing to blame.  Jones is simply 
reasoning – impeccably, as far as it goes – as follows:  
                                               
* We first presented a draft of this paper at the “Who are we to blame?” workshop at the University of Edinburgh in 
April 2019 (generously supported by the Royal Society of Edinburgh); we wish to thank audience members for their 
helpful comments, especially Jessica Brown, Antony Duff, Dana Nelkin, Samuel Rickless, Matthew Talbert, Elinor 
Mason, Justin Coates, and Maggie O’Brien.  For helpful discussion and/or comments on previous drafts of this paper, 
we wish to thank Mark Balaguer, Neal Tognazzini, Philip Swenson, Andrew Bailey, and anonymous referees for this 
journal. 
1 For differing defences of a non-hypocrisy norm on standing, see, e.g., Cohen 2006, Wallace 2010, Fritz and Miller 
2018 and 2019, Herstein 2016, Isserow and Klein 2017, Todd 2019, and Rossi 2019.  For skepticism about the non-
hypocrisy norm, however, see Bell 2013 and Dover 2019; in this paper, we set these skeptical views aside.   
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 Adulterers can’t blame adulterers.  (Instance of non-hypocrisy norm)  
 I’m an adulterer.  So, 
 I can’t blame myself.  
 
And yet it seems that something must be wrong with Jones’ argument; for just as it would seem 
to be ethical common-sense that those who violate a given norm are not in moral position to 
criticize violations of that norm, so also it seems to be ethical common-sense that we are often, 
sadly, in position (indeed, excellent, privileged position) to blame ourselves for our own moral 
failings.  And thus we have a paradox.  In short, we have a conflict between the inappropriateness 
of hypocritical blame, and the appropriateness of self-blame: 
  
Inappropriateness of hypocritical blame (IHB): For all subjects x and y and norms N, if x 
is a violator of N, then it is inappropriate for x to blame y for violating N.  
  
Appropriateness of self-blame (ASB):  For some subject x and norm N, if x is a violator 
of N, it is appropriate for x to blame x for violating norm N. 
  
While both of these principles are prima facie plausible, it is plain enough that both cannot be true. 
For let subject s be a witness for a true instance of ASB. Then s is a blameworthy violator of some 
norm and s appropriately blames s for the offence.  But by IHB, when s is both the blamer and the 
blamee (that is, when x = y), since s is a violator of the relevant norm, it is inappropriate for s to 
blame s for the offence. Contradiction.  
As with any paradox of this kind—a set of principles that are each individually plausible 
yet which seem to be jointly inconsistent—the general options for resolving the paradox are clear. 
Either demonstrate that one of the seemingly plausible principles is false, or demonstrate that the 
apparently inconsistent principles are in fact consistent. In this paper, we consider several 
promising ways of resolving the paradox which attempt to vindicate the claim that common sense 
cases of self-blame are often appropriate.  In the end, however, we contend that none of these 
ways are as defensible as a position that simply accepts it: we should never blame ourselves.  To a 





1. Standing toward the self 
 
Now, one might think the diagnosis here is simple: standing to blame is not a relation one could 
lack towards oneself, and thus the consequent of the non-hypocrisy condition must build in the 
disjunct “unless the blamer is the blamee” (i.e., unless x = y). This would, of course, immediately 
block the application of the non-hypocrisy norm to oneself – and thus immediately block our 
paradox from arising; the revised IHB principle would be consistent with ASB. But matters are 
not so simple.  The principle that standing is not a relation one could lack towards oneself is open to 
counterexample. 
Consider the following case – inspired, of course, by John Perry’s famous case pertaining 
to what he called the “essential indexical” (Perry 1979):  
 
Two messy shoppers:  Sam is shopping and notices a trail of sugar around the supermarket; 
some inattentive shopper who should know better is making a mess.  It is Julia.  Sam 
finally catches up to Julia and says, “Hey, watch what you’re doing!” Julia then points out 
that Sam too has been making a mess in exactly the same way; a trail of sugar can be seen 
behind his cart.  Julia says, “Look who’s talking!”  
 
Was it appropriate for Sam to walk around the store (even internally) blaming Julia? More to the 
point: did Sam have the standing to make the criticism he made of Julia?  And the intuition here – 
which one might contest, but which we shall not contest – is that he didn’t.  Intuitively, Sam is in 
no position to blame Julia – for his own behavior reveals that he too is a violator of precisely the 
norm at issue.  Accordingly, he is in no position to criticize Julia – a fact that Julia recognizes in 
her familiar retort.2   
 But now consider what is in essence Perry’s original case:  
 
The messy shopper:  Anand is shopping and notices a trail of sugar around the supermarket; 
some inattentive shopper who should know better is making a mess.  He begins to feel 
anger and annoyance with the messy shopper, pushing his cart around the supermarket 
                                               
2 Note: it is crucial to our case that the relevant messy shoppers are culpably unaware that they are making a mess.  In 
other words, although the shoppers don’t know that they are making a mess, they should know that they are making a 
mess.  Thus, we assume that the relevant “epistemic condition” on moral responsibility is in fact met in these cases; 
in particular, we assume that the epistemic condition on responsibility should not be stated in such a way as to require 
that a blameworthy agent knows that she is doing wrong.  It is enough that the relevant agent should know that she is 
doing wrong (Sher 2009: 71-87; for discussion, see Rudy-Hiller 2018).  
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in an attempt to find the shopper and confront him or her over this transgression. 
Anand finally catches a glimpse of the messy shopper – in the mirror.  It is himself.  He’s 
been making the mess.    
 
Our claim is simple.  Just as Sam lacked the standing (even internally) to walk around the 
supermarket criticizing Julia, so Anand lacked the standing (internally) to walk around the 
supermarket criticizing the messy shopper – which is to say that Anand lacked the standing to walk 
around the supermarket criticizing Anand.  And that is to say that one could lack standing to blame 
oneself for violating a given moral norm.  
 Such a result, of course, does not immediately entail that no one ever has the standing to 
blame himself.  Such a result only demotivates a conception of standing that makes it a conceptual 
truth that one cannot lack standing to blame oneself. In other words, this result makes the first-
pass suggestion to append “unless x = y” to IHB unduly ad hoc.  For that modification is motivated 
by the sheer contention that identity with the wrongdoer is sufficient for standing to blame that 
wrongdoer.  And, as we have seen, that contention is false.3   
But perhaps there is a related fix – that is, perhaps there is another way of formulating a 
principle about “standing to blame” relevantly similar to IHB that is consistent with ASB.  For 
perhaps one might concede that the case of Anand is a case in which someone lacks standing to 
blame himself.  But one might still insist on the following thought.  Yes, identity between blamer 
and blamee is not sufficient for standing.  However, known identity is sufficient for standing; that 
is, if a given subject knows that he is blameworthy for violating a given norm, then that subject has 
the standing to blame that subject for violating that norm.  And since, in the usual case, we know 
when we are violators of the relevant norms, in the usual cases of self-blame, we will have standing 
to blame ourselves.  The suggestion here is thus to append something like, “unless x knows that 
x = y” to IHB, thereby rendering the modified principle consistent with ASB.4  
                                               
3 One philosopher who independently agrees with this limited conclusion is Hannah Tierney; responding to Lippert-
Rasmussen’s (2021) invocation of “hypercrisy” – wherein one blames oneself for violating a certain norm, but not 
others – Tierney (forthcoming) contends that “while the hypercrite has standing to blame others but not herself, the 
hypocrite possesses standing to blame himself but not others.” Our conclusion, however, is that no one has standing 
to self-blame.   
4 Note that this route introduces a substantial and somewhat surprising complication, in so far as, it renders standing 
to blame mode-of-presentation sensitive. After all, the messy shopper certainly knows that he is himself: that is, Anand is 
an x and the messy shopper is a y such that x knows that x is y. So merely appending the disjunct “unless x knows 
that x = y” does not by itself avoid the problem. To get off the ground, the suggestion must involve the commitment 
that, while it is true that the messy shopper knows that he is himself, he only knows this under a first-person mode of 
presentation; he doesn’t know it under a “messy shopper” mode of presentation. And standing to blame is mode-of-
presentation sensitive, in the sense that x may have standing to blame y when x thinks of y under description D, but 




 But our contention is that this addition to the IHB principle, like the former one, makes 
the principle unduly ad hoc.  The non-hypocrisy norm is a norm on the appropriateness of blame. 
But the modified IHB principle builds in a restriction, so that it has the effect of bracketing-off 
cases of self-blame. That is, the principle essentially states that when a case of blame is not a case 
of (known) self-blame, then the non-hypocrisy condition applies. This renders the relevant norm 
highly disjunctive. And our contention is that, when we grasp the relevant norm, the norm we grasp 
is not any kind of disjunctive norm – a norm that says something like, “Blame the guilty party only 
if you aren’t guilty of the relevant transgression yourself, unless you know that you are the guilty 
party.”  The norm is just: “Blame the guilty party only if you aren’t guilty of the relevant 
transgression yourself.”  And our point is that this would be seem to be the relevant “norm of 
blame” – and that this very norm is a norm we cannot meet with respect to ourselves.   
 
 
2. Bifurcate blame?  
 
Instead of pursuing the (we think implausible) route of saying that the non-hypocrisy norm is 
disjunctive, one might instead bifurcate blame. On this response, there are two distinct attitudes, 
subject to different sets of norms: there is other-blame, and then there is self-blame.  (It isn’t that the 
norm is disjunctive; it is that there are two distinct attitudes subject to different norms.) Now, other-
blame is subject to some relevant non-hypocrisy norm such as IHB.  Self-blame, however, is not 
subject to any such norm.  Since self-blame is not subject to the relevant norm, self-blame remains 
appropriate, even if the self-blamer is guilty of the very offence for which he is self-blaming – but 
not so, of course, for other-blame.  The paradox, then, involves equivocation on “blame”. And once 
we see that IHB concerns other-blame and that ASB concerns self-blame, we can accept both 
principles without inconsistency.  
On this response, it would indeed always be inappropriate for any given subject to other-
blame himself – no one could have the standing to do so! – but typically, what we call “self-blame” 
is not other-blame directed towards the self, but, well, a distinct attitude altogether, viz., self-blame.  
Our response to this suggestion is brief.  In short: Self-blame is a form of blame.  So, self-
blame is subject to the norms of blame.  So, self-blame is subject to the non-hypocrisy norm.  That 
is, we find it implausible that self-blame could be anything other than, well, blame directed towards 
the self.  But then “self-blame” and “other-blame” are indeed instances of one and the same 
attitude – the difference simply being in the respective objects of that attitude.  (In the one case, that 
attitude is direct towards others.  In the other case, that very attitude is directed towards the self.) 
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But then it is deeply plausible that the non-hypocrisy norm is a norm exactly on the attitude of 
blame itself; and if this is so, it remains a norm on that attitude, whatever its object.   
Note.  Our contention here is not that all forms of blame must be subject to all of the same 
norms.  (Perhaps blaming one’s benefactors, say, is subject to certain norms to which blaming 
one’s peers is not.) Our contention is that all forms of blame must be subject to all of the general 
norms governing blame.  And our contention, once more, is that self-blame is indeed a form of blame.  
Thus: since self-blame is a form of blame, and since the non-hypocrisy norm is a norm on blame, 
self-blame is subject to the non-hypocrisy norm.   
 
 
3. The nature of hypocrisy 
 
And so perhaps we should try a new approach.  Perhaps the paradox points to an important fact 
about the non-hypocrisy condition on standing.  On this approach, for someone to fail to meet 
the non-hypocrisy condition, it is not enough, say, that that person is an adulterer blaming another 
adulterer.  It must be added that this is an adulterer who fails to blame himself for his adultery, blaming 
an adulterer.  The thought here appears simple.  If I blame myself, say, for violating the given norm, 
then it doesn’t follow that I lack standing to blame with respect to that norm.  On this approach 
to the non-hypocrisy condition, it is the inconsistency of the relevant blamer that, in some sense, 
removes that person’s standing: it is the fact that this person is prepared to blame others, but not 
himself.  If I blame myself for not replying to your emails on time, I am therefore not hypocritical 
with respect to blaming you for your failure to reply to my emails on time: I blame the both of us, 
and therefore my blaming you is not without standing.5  The suggestion, then, is that IHB must 
be amended as follows:  
 
(IHB’) For all subjects x and y and norms N, if x is a violator of N and x doesn’t blame 
x for violating N, then it is inappropriate for x to blame y for violating N.  
                                               
5 Cf. Wallace 2010, Fritz and Miller 2018. However, it is worth noting that this intuition about standing is contested; 
see, e.g., Rivera-López (2017: 343), who (in response to Wallace) writes, “Acknowledging (or criticizing myself for) 
my own faults does not restore my moral standing to blame others, regardless of how sincere such self-blame might 
be.” 
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IHB’ is equivalent to saying that in order to meet the non-hypocrisy condition, then either (a) you 
have to not be a violator of N, or (b) you have to self-blame for violating N.  Thus, self-blaming 
is sufficient to meet the non-hypocrisy condition.6   
Far from resolving the paradox we have presented, however, this suggestion simply 
deepens it.  But here we must back up.  In this paper, we are primarily concerned with one necessary 
condition on standing: the non-hypocrisy condition.  More generally, however, we assume that the 
non-hypocrisy condition is one of a certain set of necessary and sufficient conditions on standing.  
In particular, the assumption we wish to make is that if a given agent meets the non-hypocrisy 
condition, as well as any other conditions on standing (such as, perhaps, the “business condition”, 
or the “non-complicity condition”, or the “warrant condition”7) then that is sufficient for the agent’s 
standing.  Letting C1,…,Cn be any other conditions on standing, then we suggest: 
 
(Standing) For all subjects x and y and norms N, it is appropriate for x to blame y for  
violating N iff [(x meets the non-hypocrisy condition) & C1 & C2 &...& Cn] 
 
In the current dialectical context, we can simply assume that the relevant agent has met all of the 
other conditions on standing.  Thus, if that agent meets the non-hypocrisy condition, that will 
suffice for that agent’s standing.8   
 Now the point.  Recall that, according to IHB’, self-blaming is sufficient to meet the non-
hypocrisy condition.  And now suppose that, in the relevant context, all the other conditions 
C1,…,Cn are met, so that an agent’s meeting the non-hypocrisy condition is sufficient for that 
agent’s having standing.  The result is simple.  On this approach, since self-blame can be sufficient 
for meeting the non-hypocrisy condition, in the relevant context, one can render it the case that 
one has standing to blame oneself … precisely by blaming oneself.  However, it is senseless to 
suggest that if one blames oneself for violating the given norm, then … one has standing to blame 
oneself for violating that norm.  Having the standing to blame a given wrongdoer is a conceptually 
prior necessary condition on the appropriateness of one’s blaming that wrongdoer.  Thus: one 
cannot render one’s blame appropriate simply and precisely by blaming.   Said differently: one cannot 
                                               
6 Note: IHB’ is of course consistent with ASB, which can be seen as follows: Let subject s be a witness for a true 
instance of ASB. Then s is a blameworthy violator of some norm and it is appropriate for s to blame s for the offence.  
By IHB’ it follows that s indeed blames s for the offense – and so indeed has standing to blame s.    
7 For more on the business condition, see Radzik 2011 and Seim 2019, and for more on the non-complicity condition, 
see Cohen 2006, and for more on the warrant condition, see Friedman 2013 and Coates 2016; for discussion, see 
Coates and Tognazzini 2018.  
8 Notably, however, Todd (2019) contends that the “business” and “warrant” conditions are not genuine conditions 
on standing, and the non-complicity condition reduces to the non-hypocrisy condition.  Thus, meeting the non-
hypocrisy condition is necessary and sufficient for standing.  Here, however, we remain neutral about whether there are 
any other conditions on standing than the non-hypocrisy condition. 
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bootstrap the appropriateness of one’s blaming a given wrongdoer precisely by blaming that 
wrongdoer.  In the present context: the appropriateness of blaming oneself is exactly what is at 
issue; this appropriateness cannot simply be achieved by doing the blaming.   
One might suppose that the problem here can be solved with a dispositional fix. Perhaps 
when I myself am a violator of N, it isn’t my actually blaming myself for violating N that suffices for 
my standing to blame with respect to N, but instead my being disposed to blame myself that suffices 
for my standing.  Thus, suppose we tried: 
 
(IHB’’) For all subjects x and y and norms N, if x is a violator of N and x isn’t disposed 
to blame x for violating N, then it is inappropriate for x to blame y for violating N.  
 
But this second suggestion seems little better than the first.  After all, having the right to φ is a 
conceptually prior necessary condition on its being appropriate for one to be disposed to φ.  In other 
words, just as one cannot render it appropriate for one to φ precisely by φ-ing, so similarly one 
cannot render it appropriate to φ by becoming disposed to φ.  It first must be appropriate for one to 
φ; then it may be appropriate for one to be disposed to φ. 
 There is, however, another way of bringing out the severity of the problems facing IHB’ 
and IHB’’.  The problem is that these principles do not seem apt to give to their proponents what 
they want.  In short, from the perspective of a rival theory to our own – one on which self-blame 
is sometimes appropriate – then these principles will face an undergeneration problem: they will 
undergenerate cases of what should be appropriate cases of self-blame.  After all, notice that both 
IHB’ and IHB’’ in fact vindicate the position of Jones the Adulterer.  In particular, notice that Jones 
the Adulterer neither blames himself, nor is disposed to blame himself.  The result: according to 
IHB’ and IHB’’, Jones lacks the standing to blame himself!  (Just let x = y, and note that, in this 
case, we do not have an x who is disposed to blame x.) Of course, we are content to accept the 
result that Jones the Adulterer lacks standing to blame himself – but the point is that, if, as our 
opponents will contend, self-blame is ever in fact appropriate, it seems wholly unacceptable that 
Jones should be prohibited from blaming himself just because he isn’t in fact disposed to do so.   
The point that, according to IHB’/IHB’’, Jones lacks the standing to blame himself doesn’t 
in itself entail that, given these principles, no one ever has standing to blame himself.  However, we 
do think these principles would, if true, go some ways towards supporting that conclusion.  
Consider the following argument:  
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1. If self-blame is sometimes appropriate, then it is appropriate for Jones the Adulterer 
to blame himself [even if he doesn’t].  
2. But given IHB’/IHB’’, it is not appropriate for Jones the Adulterer to blame himself 
[because he doesn’t blame himself, and isn’t disposed to] 
3. So, given IHB’/IHB’’, self-blame is never appropriate.   
 
We have defended (1) and (2), and (3) follows.   
 
 
4. Bifurcate the blamer 
 
The responses to the paradox so far have all somehow attempted to modify the non-hypocrisy 
principle so that it is consistent with there being appropriate cases of self-blame. Another type of 
response insists that the cases we ordinarily call “self-blame” are not really cases where x blames 
x. Strictly speaking, there are never appropriate cases of self-blame. ASB is false.  But, according 
to this response, the ordinary cases we call “self-blame” are nevertheless often appropriate because 
they really involve non-hypocritical other-blame. The strategy here is to bifurcate the blamer.  There 
are two ways one might wish to carry out this project: bifurcate the blamer at a time, and bifurcate 
the blamer over time.   
 The first strategy begins with a familiar – and certainly ancient – model of the self.  On 
this model, the self is composed of “parts” – for instance, as in Aristotle, the rational part, and the 
appetitive part.  And the central suggestion of the current strategy is the following.  In cases of 
what we might ordinarily call “self-blame” – cases we might ordinarily describe as someone 
blaming herself for what she has done – what is really going on in these cases is that one part of the 
relevant “self” is blaming a distinct part of the given “self”.  Thus, the thing that is doing the blaming 
(say, the “rational part” of the person) is in fact not identical to the thing that is being blamed (say, 
the “appetitive part” of the person).  And thus, this response contends, no violation of the requisite 
norm on blame is implied.  For the given norm on blame prohibits x from blaming y when x is 
guilty of the relevant transgression.  But even in cases of “self-blame” (where we might have 
thought x = y), we do not really have any such x blaming x – instead, we have some relevant x 
blaming some distinct y (of course, some y to which it bears a particularly intimate relation).  In 
short, the suggestion is that the relevant subjects and objects of the attitude of blame are not what we 
might ordinarily consider “persons” (single human organisms, say) – rather, the subjects and 
objects of these attitudes are parts or aspects of persons.  (Alternatively, one might suggest that any 
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given human organism is constituted by several distinct persons [a human Trinity, perhaps]; but 
we set this even more radical suggestion aside.)  
 We do not hereby wish to take issue with the theory that the self has “parts”.  We instead 
wish to take issue with the given application of that theory – which is subject to several serious 
problems.  We mention only the following.  Consider blame directed towards others.  The problem 
is that if this strategy works to show that the relevant instances of what we ordinarily call “self-
blame” imply no violation of the standing norm, it would also show that paradigm cases of 
violation of that norm are in fact no such cases at all.  Suppose that I blame you for failing to reply 
to my emails on time.  You then point out, correctly, that I regularly fail to reply to your emails on 
time.  I then say: well, it is my appetitive part that fails to reply to those emails on time, but it is my 
rational part that is blaming you for failing to reply on time – and so I am no hypocritical blamer 
after all.  You will, of course, reject this explanation.  You will say that if I fail to manage my 
“appetitive part” in the requisite way, then I am in no position to blame you when you fail to manage 
your “appetitive part” in an exactly analogous way.  And so the current suggestion about the 
subjects and objects of the attitude of blame – even if it were plausible in itself (which it isn’t) – 
would not undergird the desired distinction, according to which self-blame can never violate the 
non-hypocrisy norm on blame, whereas other-blame can (and often does).   
The second way of carrying out the project of bifurcating the blamer is to bifurcate the 
blamer over time.  The thought here is again familiar.  On this approach, in cases we might ordinarily 
describe as “self-blame”, the x doing the blaming is never in fact identical to the x being blamed.  
On this approach, for instance, Jones-at-t1 is a distinct entity as compared to Jones-at-t2; and when 
Jones-at-t2 blames Jones-at-t1, we do not have any entity blaming itself, for Jones-at-t2 is not 
identical to Jones-at-t1.  Besides the obvious intrinsic metaphysical costs associated with this 
theory, however, the problem is that this response is subject to the same problems associated with 
the response above.  Suppose that I blame you for failing to reply to my emails on time.  You then 
point out, correctly, that I regularly fail to reply to your emails on time.  I then say: well, that was 
me-at-t1, and it is me-at-t2 who is now blaming you for your failure.  You will, of course, reject this 
explanation – but any rate, we can once again note that even if this position were plausible in itself, 
it would not undergird the desired distinction, according to which self-blame can never violate the 






5. Some accounts in the literature – and literature 
 
At this stage, one might worry that the paradox arises, perhaps, only given some relatively 
idiosyncratic understanding of the “non-hypocrisy” condition on standing to blame – an 
understanding that is in conflict with recent statements of that condition in the literature.  Needless 
to say, we can’t consider every statement of the non-hypocrisy condition that exists in the 
literature; we will content ourselves to observe that a conflict between the non-hypocrisy condition 
and the appropriateness of self-blame seems to arise given two prominent recent accounts of that 
condition offered by Todd (2019) and Fritz and Miller (2018 and 2019).  
 Todd’s account is simple and straightforward: “one has moral standing to blame [a given 
responsible wrongdoer] if and only if one is morally committed to the values that condemn the 
wrongdoer’s actions.”  (2019: 357) Todd’s account is thus a moral commitment account of standing.  
Here we must be brief.  Plausibly, in order to match the intuitive data concerning who “lacks 
standing”, the “commitment” at issue in Todd’s account needs to be very strong.  However, if the 
“commitment” at issue is strong enough to match the data, it will also be strong enough to imply 
that violators of norms, insofar as they are, are never in fact committed to the values undergirding 
those norms – in which case those violators will, given Todd’s account, lack standing to blame 
those who violate them, including themselves.  Thus, given Todd’s account, we could always, for 
example, reason impeccably as follows:   
 
1. Only committed vegetarians can blame people for ordering steak. (Application of 
standing norm) 
2. I am not a committed vegetarian. (See: I just ordered steak.) So, 
3. I cannot blame myself for ordering steak.   
 
Thus, Todd’s account generates a conflict with the appropriateness of self-blame. Of course, our 
claim is that this is not, in itself, a defect in Todd’s account, but a result with which we can learn to 
live.9   
                                               
9 More recently, Todd (ms) defends what he calls the be better norm of criticism, according to which one must criticize 
x with respect to norm N only if one is better than x with respect to N.  (For a similar proposal, see Rivera- López 
2017: 344.) What motivates Todd’s analysis, it seems, is the idea (to which we ultimately appeal below) that to blame 
is (inter alia) to stand in judgment – and the idea that the imagery of standing in judgment is to be taken seriously.  To 
stand in judgment is to look down on the one judged.  But when x is no better than y, x cannot look down on y.  In any 
case, the important point in the present context is the following: Todd’s be better norm immediately rules out the 
appropriateness of self-blame.  Plainly, if in order to appropriately blame, the blamer must be better (in the relevant 
respect) than the blamee, then since for no x is x better than x, and necessarily so, no one appropriately self-blames. 
In a similar vein, Rivera-López contends that standing requires moral superiority with respect to the blamee.  
Interestingly, Rivera-López seems to sense a tension between this view and the appropriateness of self-blame; he 
writes: “In my view, what we call ‘self-blame’ is rather the expression of other kinds of attitudes: repentance, guilt, 
remorse, among others. I only blame myself (for example, by expressing indignation) for my own act metaphorically. 
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Fritz and Miller’s (2018) account is also simple and straightforward.  For Fritz and Miller, 
lacking standing is a matter of being unfairly differentially disposed to blame.  Simply put: if you are 
unfairly differentially disposed to blame violators of some norm N, then you lack standing to 
blame with respect to norm N.  Given Fritz and Miller’s account of standing, we have strong 
reason to conclude that no one has standing to blame himself.  How so?  The problem, we hope 
to show, parallels closely the problem of undergeneration mentioned at the end of Section 3. 
 To begin, note that it is a central component of Fritz and Miller’s view that even the 
inconsistent blamer lacks standing to blame.  For instance, consider this case developed by Todd 
(2019: 370).  Suppose Michael has two colleagues, Ellie and Suilin, both of whom regularly fail to 
reply to his emails on time.  However, Michael is only really disposed to blame Ellie for this failure, 
but not Suilin – and there is no adequate moral justification for this differential disposition.  Fritz 
and Miller insist that it therefore follows that since (i) Michael rejects the equality of persons with 
respect to norm N (replying on time), he (ii) therefore forfeits the right to blame with respect to 
norm N, which amounts to saying that he lacks the standing to blame both Ellie and Suilin for 
their failure to reply to his emails on time.10  But now consider.  Suppose Michael in fact himself 
often fails to reply to his colleagues’ emails on time.  And suppose that he knows that he does so, 
knows that this is wrong, and blames himself for this failure.  Other things being equal, is Michael’s 
blame appropriate, in the sense that Michael has the standing to blame himself for this failure? 
 Fritz and Miller’s account straightforwardly tells us that it isn’t.  After all, from what we’ve 
been told above, Michael rejects the equality of persons with respect to N: he is (unfairly) disposed 
to blame Ellie, but not Suilin – and that, Fritz and Miller insist, is enough to count as rejecting the 
equality of persons with respect to the given norm, which equality grounds one’s right to blame.  
By a straightforward application of Fritz and Miller’s theory, it therefore follows that Michael lacks 
the standing to blame with respect to violations of N.  But then: Michael therefore lacks the standing 
to blame his own violations of N.   
From the perspective of a moral theory on which self-blame is sometimes appropriate, it 
is wholly unacceptable that Michael could be prohibited from blaming himself for violating N, 
simply and precisely because he rejects the equality of persons with respect to N!  In other words, 
if self-blame is ever appropriate, then Michael’s blaming himself should be an appropriate case of 
                                               
This would require splitting myself into two selves: one superior self who admonishes the other, inferior self. This 
can only be metaphorical.” (2017: 360) Rivera-López suggests that what we normally call “self-blame” is not literally 
blame directed at oneself; instead it is really just guilt or remorse. We agree that colloquially “self-blame” may often 
just mean “guilt”. But we think Rivera-López goes too far. We agree that self-blame would only be appropriate if there 
were two selves – one who didn’t violate the norm and the other who did. But insisting that appropriate self-blame is 
impossible is very different from insisting that self-blame is impossible. (More on these themes below.)  
10 Todd (2019) is highly critical of this implication of Fritz and Miller’s theory, regarding it (roughly) as a reductio of 
that theory.  Fritz and Miller (2019), however, further embrace and defend this result. 
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self-blame. The mere fact that he is inclined to blame Ellie but not Suilin shouldn’t imply that he 
is not permitted to blame himself. But on Fritz and Miller’s account, Michael’s blaming himself is 
in fact not an appropriate case of self-blame, since it is an instance of a blamer blaming a blamee 
for violating a norm, when the blamer rejects the equality of persons with respect to that norm.   
Slightly more carefully, we can put our argument here as follows: 
 
1. If self-blame is sometimes appropriate, Michael’s blaming himself is appropriate. 
2. If Fritz and Miller’s account is correct, Michael’s blaming himself is not     
appropriate. [He is unfairly differentially disposed to blame with respect to the 
violation in question.] 
3. So, if Fritz and Miller’s account is correct, then self-blame is never appropriate. 
 
Thus, both the account from Todd and the account from Fritz and Miller give us the resources, 
in different ways, to reach some version of our startling conclusion: we never have the standing to 
blame ourselves.  
 Before we turn to our own preferred solution to the paradox, it is worth appreciating that 
the paradox arises, not merely given recent statement of the non-hypocrisy norm in the literature, 
but also given what would seem to be foundational expressions of the non-hypocrisy norm familiar 
from non-philosophical contexts. Consider, for instance, Jesus’ famous intervention on behalf of 
the woman caught in adultery: “Let he who is without sin cast the first stone.” (John 8:7) As 
various commentators have noticed, this standard is, of course, considerably more stringent than 
the one at issue in this paper – which is a standard more like “Let he who is at least not an adulterer 
cast the first stone.” But the point here is simple.  According to the moral lesson we are 
(presumably) meant to learn from this episode, to blame, of course, is akin to casting a stone.  But 
if only he who is without sin may cast a stone, and only he who is with sin is a candidate for stoning, 
then of course no one should be in the business of casting any stones on himself.  To a defense of 
that thought we now turn.   
  
 
6. Self-blame and guilt 
 
We turn now to one final response to the paradox we have presented we wish to consider – and 
this is the response that we recommend.  This response is simply to accept the surprising 
conclusion. We accept the non-hypocrisy principle, and accept that it renders self-blame 
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inappropriate: insofar as we recognize that we are candidates for blame with respect to a given norm, 
we should therefore accept that we are not candidates for blaming with respect to that norm – and we 
should therefore simply accept that, insofar as we are blameworthy for  violating a norm, we should 
not blame even ourselves for violating that norm.  Precisely the condition of the guilty self that 
makes the guilty self ill-suited to blame others likewise makes the guilty self ill-suited to blame itself.  
Now, above we maintained that it is implausible to bifurcate blame – to maintain that we have two 
fundamentally distinct attitudes involved in self-blame and other-blame.  However, it is not, we 
contend, similarly implausible to contend that the following involve two fundamentally distinct 
psychological attitudes: blame, and guilt.  Whereas it is implausible to suggest that self-blame and 
other-blame are distinct attitudes, it is not similarly implausible to suggest that blame is one attitude 
– subject to a singular, non-disjunctive non-hypocrisy norm, whereas guilt is another attitude 
altogether, subject to no such norm at all.   
 Revisit the case of Anand.  What is it that becomes appropriate once Anand discovers that 
he is the messy shopper?  What becomes appropriate is not, we contend, one and the same attitude 
that Anand exhibited as he strode around the supermarket, looking for the messy shopper – except 
that it now becomes appropriate that Anand should knowingly exhibit that attitude towards himself.  
For that attitude was the attitude of blame – of, we might say, standing in judgment with respect to the 
wrongdoer.  And when Anand discovers that he is the messy shopper, it is strained and implausible 
to suggest that it now becomes appropriate that Anand should stand in judgment with respect to 
Anand.  What becomes appropriate, perhaps, is Anand’s recognition that, in principle, it would be 
appropriate for some conscientious shopper who isn’t himself to exhibit the relevant attitude towards 
himself.  And it is appropriate, perhaps, all else equal, for Anand to be pained by that fact: it is 
fitting that others should blame me.11  But recognizing that it would be appropriate for someone 
else to exhibit an attitude towards oneself, and being pained by that fact, does not imply the 
appropriateness of one’s exhibiting that attitude towards oneself.  In short: what becomes 
appropriate is not Anand’s blaming himself for his messy shopping; that was not appropriate when 
he was in ignorance that he was the messy shopper, and it remains inappropriate once he realizes 
that he is.  What becomes appropriate, if anything, is Anand’s pained recognition of his guilt – in 
short, of his feeling guilty.  But this attitude must be distinguished from the attitude of blame 
directed towards the self.12    
                                               
11 Cf. Sartre’s position that “[shame] is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is 
looking at and judging.” (Sartre 1943: 261). 
12 Very often, it is not; see, e.g., Carlsson 2017 and Carlsson forthcoming, who identifies guilt with self-blame.  
However, see, e.g., Gibbard 1992: 139: “Guilt and shame, then, are first-person counterparts to anger and disdain. 
Not that guilt is self-directed anger; feeling guilty is different from feeling you could kick yourself.” Cf. also Duggan 
2018: 299, who, in distinguishing between self-blame and guilt, writes: “Guilt doesn’t aim to hurt.  It just hurts.” Note: 
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 But how, precisely, should these attitudes be distinguished?  We suggest the following 
account. 
  
Blame: x blames y iff x stands in judgment with respect to y and condemns y, accompanied 
by some sort of negative affect (or “hostile attitude”13).   
 
Of course, given this construal of blame, we can thus distinguish: 
 
Other-blame: when an agent stands in judgment with respect to an agent and 
condemns that agent, accompanied by some sort of negative affect, where the 
agent who stands in judgment is distinct from the agent judged.   
 
Self-blame: when an agent stands in judgment with respect to an agent and 
condemns that agent, accompanied by some sort of negative affect, where the 
agent who stands in judgment is identical to the agent judged.  
 
But we contend that self-blame must be distinguished from guilt:  
 
Guilt: x feels guilt/feels guilty iff x judges (de se) that x is blameworthy, and is pained (in 
the right way) by that judgment.14 
  
Having thus distinguished these attitudes15, our core contention is that one may – and one should 
– feel guilt without also self-blaming.   
 
                                               
Duggan distinguishes between blame (and therefore self-blame) and guilt at least partially in terms of their respective 
social roles.  However, we are skeptical of the claim that blame “aims to hurt” in the relevant sense; for instance, it 
seems strained to suggest that the angry resentment I feel towards the actions of distant agents I hear about on TV 
aims at their suffering. 
13 Bell (2013: 265).   
14 We will not try to specify fully what it takes to be pained “in the right way” relevant to guilt.  Presumably, for 
instance, the pain needs to be emotional in some way (and not merely “physical” – as in a pain in one’s elbow) – and 
the pain needs to be non-deviantly caused by the judgment. One further issue: there may be a subtle “one thought 
too many” issue here. Does one feel guilty because one is pained by the judgment that one is blameworthy? Or does 
one feel guilty because one is pained by the judgment that one has performed the act in virtue of which one judges 
oneself to be blameworthy? If the reader thinks the latter is more to the point, we may modify our characterization of 
guilt appropriately. 
15 Linguistically, it is worth noting that “blame” is a transitive verb relating a subject to a direct object (as in “give” or 
“poke”), whereas “(feeling) guilt” is an intransitive verb (as in “sneezed” or “cries”). In other words, blame involves 






Perhaps it will help if we further develop the sort of recommendation that (we contend) follows from 
the arguments developed in this paper.  Our contention is that, when we recognize that we are 
blameworthy, we should (ceteris paribus) feel guilt, but we should not self-blame.  More particularly, 
consider the following sort of advice.  
 
You have been blaming yourself, poor soul?  And for what? For being a scoundrel, you 
say.  But consider he who it is that condemns you.  Consider that he who condemns you 
is too a scoundrel. And consider that – even if you are a scoundrel – you would never 
concern yourself with the condemnation of a fellow scoundrel.  Thus: silence the voice 
inside you who condemns you.  The voice of the one who condemns is the voice of one 
no better than the one condemned. Or do you look down on yourself? But the one who 
looks down is no higher than the one looked down upon.   
 
Nevertheless: Feel badly that you are blameworthy. But do not self-blame.   
 
We admit that this is advice that is not immediately clear we know how to follow.  How can we 
go about feeling badly that we are blameworthy, without blaming ourselves? Our contention, 
however, is that this is advice it is possible to follow.  One can feel guilt, without self-blaming.   
 Consider the following analogy.  It certainly seems possible for Jones to feel praiseworthy 
– to judge that he is praiseworthy, and to feel good about his being praiseworthy – without its 
being the case that Jones praises himself.  Or consider that it certainly seems possible that Sarah 
should feel admirable, without its being the case that Sarah admires herself.  Indeed, it seems evident 
that it is sound advice that though we should (in the right way, and to the right degree) sometimes 
feel admirable, we should, in general, refrain from admiring ourselves. To feel good about being 
admirable is, well, just that.  To admire oneself is something else entirely: it is, so to speak, to “go 
before the mirror” and admire what one sees.  It is sound advice that we should, at least sometimes, 
feel an appropriate sort of pride (in the right way, and to the right degree).  But that advice is 
certainly entirely different in kind from the advice that we should, on those occasions, praise ourselves 
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to the relevant degree.  One can feel praiseworthy, without ever praising oneself – and without 
anyone else ever praising one either.16    
 Our advice now comes into focus.  Just as it may be sound advice that we should 
(sometimes) feel praiseworthy, but not praise ourselves, so it is sound advice, we contend, that we 
should (when we are blameworthy) feel blameworthy, but not blame ourselves.  Setting aside cases 
like that of Anand, to blame oneself is, so to speak, to go before the mirror and become hostile 
with what one sees.  To feel blameworthy, however, is to feel badly on account of one’s 
blameworthiness.  And these are different things.  One may do one without doing the other.  When 
one is blameworthy, one can sit with one’s guilt.  One can condemn the qualities of one’s self that 
make one blameworthy – or one can condemn the acts one performed that make one blameworthy. 
One can, on that accord, feel badly about having those qualities, or about having performed those 
acts.  But one can nevertheless refrain from being angry with oneself for having those qualities or 
for having performed those acts.    
Phenomenologically, we suggest, the attitude of self-blame can be associated with what we 
might call self-othering – with addressing oneself in hostile tones second-personally:  
 
You fool!  Yet again, you didn’t email her back on time.  This is just like you. Dropping the ball.  Letting 
everyone down.    
 
Let us be clear.  Our point here is not the familiar one that we shouldn’t go too hard on ourselves or 
self-flagellate – that is, we shouldn’t punish ourselves disproportionately (though of course we 
shouldn’t).  Our point is that precisely insofar as these attitudes are blame at all then they are 
inappropriate.  You may be right: you didn’t email her back on time.  And yes, that is just like you.  
We blame you for that.  That is our job.  Feel badly about what you did.  But leave the hostile 
                                               
16 Consider one further comparison (which we lack the space to fully articulate).  Consider the phenomenology of 
finding someone attractive.  There is a sort of sexual desire for the object of one’s attraction. But now consider the 
phenomenology of feeling attractive.  This is (in the right context) certainly a positive feeling.  One puts on the dress, or 
suit (or…) and looks in mirror – and one feels attractive (feels “sexy”). But this is, of course, entirely different from 
feeling sexual desire for the person one judges to be sexy, viz., oneself.  That is, when one puts on a special dress or 
suit and feels sexy, this is not to be conflated with feeling attraction to (or desire for) oneself.  Importantly, this same 
phenomenon seems to hold when the valence is changed.  Consider the phenomenology of finding someone 
unattractive (or sexually repellent).  There is a sort of revulsion here, a sort of desire to not become intimate with the 
object that repels you.  But now consider the phenomenology of feeling unattractive or sexually unappealing.  One puts 
on one’s drab, tired clothes and looks in the mirror, and feels down about how unappealing (or perhaps even repellent) 
one takes oneself to be. But this is entirely different from feeling sexual aversion for the person one judges to be 
sexually repellent, viz., oneself.  That is, when one feels sexually unappealing, this is not to be conflated with feeling 
sexual aversion for oneself – a desire to not be intimate with oneself.  Now our core claim. Just as one may feel 
unattractive or sexually unappealing, but not be sexually repelled by oneself, so one may feel guilt or shame, but not 
be angry with or hostile with oneself. 
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feelings to us.17 Is that unintelligible?  Well, why should it be?  We can understand the following.  
You may be right: you worked so hard to raise all of that money for charity.  We praise you for 
that. Feel good about what you did.  But leave the praising to us.  Don’t go (even internally) 
praising yourself for being so good. Just feel good for being so good.  Don’t do the additional thing; 
don’t praise yourself.18 
   
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have argued that it is always inappropriate to blame ourselves.  We regard the 
arguments of this paper for this conclusion to be compelling – and certainly they point to difficult 
to questions about the nature of blame, hypocrisy, and moral standing.19 If we are right, however, 
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